

65-1322

15 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara  
Secretary of Defense

By direction of NSAM-317, USIB established a Technical Surveillance Counter-measure Committee under the temporary chairmanship of Mr. Thomas Karamessines, Assistant Deputy Director for Plans for CIA. The Committee is made up of representatives of the Intelligence Community. The work is to be carried out by two sub-committees -- one with responsibility for research and development, and the other for implementation of agreed measures.

I am of the opinion, and USIB concurs, that this Committee should have a full-time chairman. [redacted] for ten years Chief of Technical Services Division, CIA, who is particularly well qualified in this field, is free to accept this appointment. His selection has been concurred in by General Carter of CIA, General Carroll of DIA, and Mr. Hughes of the Department of State.

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Prior to making this formal appointment, I would like to have your views since the work of this Committee requires not only the support of the Intelligence Community, but that of other elements of the Department of State and Department of Defense.

There is some urgency attached to this matter since Mr. [redacted] is willing to serve, but is delaying a decision on other opportunities open to him until this question is resolved.

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

DOS REVIEW COMPLETED

JOHN A. McCONE  
Director

cc: The Secretary of State

The Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Orig - Addressee  
cc2 - DCI  
cc ER

APPROVED IN DRAFT BY MR. McCONE, 15 Mar 65

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15 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable Robert S. McNamara  
Secretary of Defense

Mr. McCone has read the attached and asked  
that it be brought to your personal attention.


WALTER ELLER  
Executive Assistant

Attachment

cc: The Secretary of State  
The Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

Orig - Addressee

cc 2 - DCI  
cc ER



12 February 1965

*CA-1*  
The Honorable Robert S. McNamara  
The Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am attaching for your information two CIA memoranda dealing with the Cyprus situation. The first memo points out that there have been no significant moves toward a reconciliation of Greek and Turkish interests in the island and that the situation there remains basically explosive.

The second memo describes the Soviet position on the Cyprus dispute and the skillful manner in which Moscow has exploited the issue.

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Acting Director

**Attachments:**

1. Intelligence Memorandum dated 12 Feb 65, Subject: Cyprus (OCI No. 0763/65)
2. OCI Special Report dated 12 February 1965, Subject: Soviet Policy and Tactics in the Cyprus Dispute (OCI No. 0276/65A)

Identical letters sent to: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy, The Honorable W. Averell Harriman, The Honorable George W. Ball, The Honorable Phillips Talbot, The Honorable John T. McNaughton, The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance, General Earle G. Wheeler *card*

**Distribution:**

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1 - ER via ExDir w/att

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12 February 1965

OCI No. 0763/65

Copy No.

## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CYPRUS

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

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12 February 1965

OCI No. 0763/65

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

CYPRUS

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

Office of Current Intelligence

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OCI No. 0763/65

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Office of Current Intelligence  
12 February 1965

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

Cyprus

SUMMARY

1. Despite the absence of overt incidents in Cyprus during the past several weeks, there has been no significant movement toward a reconciliation of the national interests involved nor of the Greek and Turkish communities on the island. The situation therefore remains basically explosive. The Greek Cypriots, because of weakening support for their position in both the Soviet Bloc and among the non-aligned nations, are no longer hopeful of obtaining settlement through the UN General Assembly and are moving ahead with plans to create unilaterally a new regime on Cyprus. US, British, and UN attempts to stimulate direct negotiations between the Turks and the Greeks or the Turks and Greek Cypriots have not been productive. Makarios, strengthened by the recent arrival of Soviet-built military equipment, appears ready to engage in new exercises in brinksmanship with the Turks. The most immediate danger involves Ankara's plans to rotate part of its army contingent on Cyprus later this month. Makarios has thus far refused to permit this rotation. In the longer run, Makarios' announced plans to conduct unified elections and re-write the constitution--with or without Turkish Cypriot agreement or participation--is likely to spark new crises. Turkish leaders in Ankara, giving the impression that they now have Soviet assurance not to intervene in case Turkey moves against Cyprus, are warning that they will not make further concessions to prevent violence. In the event of hostilities, there appears to be increasing danger that Turkish attacks would also be launched against the Greek islands off the Turkish coast or against Greek Thrace.

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1. Six months ago, Turkish Air Force jets, reacting to widespread Greek Cypriot attacks against Turkish Cypriot positions, bombed Cyprus and presented the world with the imminent threat of a new Greco-Turkish war. During the period of relative peace since then, the Greek Cypriots have implemented, by legislative decree and executive fiat, plans for creation of a new governmental structure based on majority, i.e., Greek Cypriot rule. The political structure created by the constitution of 1960, under which the Turkish Cypriot minority (18% of the population) held wide political powers, including veto rights over important legislation, has been drastically altered. A de facto government, entirely Greek Cypriot in composition, rules over 95% of the area of Cyprus.

2. Prior to the outbreak of violence in 1963, Makarios had proposed thirteen amendments to the original constitution. The net effect of these proposals--if implemented--would have been creation of a government entirely under Greek Cypriot control. The Turkish Government, acting on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community, rejected the proposals outright. Over the past year, however, ten of the thirteen points have been achieved and the remaining three are expected to be accomplished soon.

3. Despite these gains, the Greek Cypriots appear less optimistic of early victory today than they did six months ago. Some Turkish Cypriots have accepted Greek Cypriot rule, but the majority of that community remain in enclaves to which they fled when violence broke out. Widespread unemployment and primitive living conditions for many of these refugees have not yet forced them back to their villages in Greek-held territory. Turkish Cypriot morale is reported higher today than it has been in months because of recent changes involving Cyprus on the international plane.

4. Meanwhile, within the Greek community there are signs of growing discord over both the final goal of the struggle and the means of achieving that goal. The foreign policies of Makarios have come under increasing attack from supporters of General Grivas and right-wing Greek Cypriot newspapers. Some Cypriot newspapermen, who have

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previously written vitriolic articles against the West, are reportedly pondering the possibility of throwing their support to a new foreign policy less dependent on the Soviet Bloc. Violence within the Greek Cypriot community is on the increase. Several score explosions have occurred in recent weeks, but no arrests have been made and no explanations furnished by the government. Press accusations that UN troops have been involved have not been substantiated, and it is generally assumed that factional or personal Greek Cypriot rivalries are responsible.

5. The upsurge in Turkish Cypriot morale and the ferment within the Greek community can be traced to recent developments outside Cyprus. Most important of these are (a) an apparent change in Soviet policy toward the Cyprus dispute, and (b) developments in connection with the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.

6. Through October 1964, all parties to the Cyprus dispute appeared convinced that the USSR supported the Greek Cypriots in their contest with the Turks. Moscow was on record as against partition of Cyprus and in favor of the political integrity and independence of the island. The USSR also negotiated an agreement to supply arms to the Cypriots, although the terms of this agreement have never been revealed.

7. Beginning with Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin's visit to Moscow in early November, the pendulum of Soviet foreign policy appeared to swing toward a more neutral--if not pro-Turkish--position. Soviet spokesmen have emphasized that they have always opposed enosis (union with Greece) and that they recognize the need to find a solution acceptable to both ethnic communities on Cyprus. While both of these views are opposed by the Greek Cypriots, it was Foreign Minister Gromyko's suggestion that "federation" might form the basis for a Cyprus solution that caused a violent reaction in both Athens and Nicosia. Ankara has long demanded a "federal solution" for Cyprus.

8. The Soviet Ambassador in Nicosia reportedly has told Makarios that the USSR would not intervene if Turkey were forced to take military action to prevent enosis. Conversely, it appears unlikely that Soviets would support partition of Cyprus as this would also result in the island and its military bases

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falling under the control of NATO states. The USSR presumably prefers a demilitarized, independent republic in which the already powerful local communist party might maneuver for eventual control.

9. There have been other disappointments for the Greek Cypriots. Both Makarios and the Greek Government have emphasized for months that Cypriot hopes were focused on securing a favorable resolution from the United Nations General Assembly. The Greeks and Greek Cypriots hoped to obtain a resolution supporting "unfettered independence and self-determination"--the latter interpreted by the Greeks in Athens as a synonym for enosis. They recognized that there was little likelihood of obtaining support from the Western powers for a resolution which would have the effect of nullifying the Cyprus Agreement of 1960. Support, however, was anticipated from both the Soviet Bloc and the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries. Makarios assiduously has sought to align Cyprus with the Afro-Asians on international issues in preparation for the present session of the UNGA.

10. The dispute in New York over Article 19 of the Charter has made it uncertain when, if at all during the current session, the Cyprus issue will be discussed. In Nicosia and Athens, however, there is no longer any real anticipation of victory at the UNGA. This pessimism is based not only on the change in Soviet policy toward Cyprus but also on discovery of unexpected resistance among the Afro-Asians to the use of the term "self-determination"--when it obviously means enosis--in any resolution.

11. With little chance that the UNGA will move the Cyprus problem toward solution, attention is again turning to possible negotiations among the parties directly involved. Greek-Turkish negotiations, held under US sponsorship last summer, collapsed partly as a result of inability of the Greeks to sell the proposed compromise solution to Makarios. It is generally accepted that in any future negotiations the Greek Cypriot leadership will have to be directly involved.

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12. UN mediator Galo Plaza has been mentioned as a possible catalytic agent to get the parties around a conference table. Plaza has been working for several months on a report containing his recommendations for a solution. Thus far, his report has been very closely held and he apparently will not make his recommendations known until the UNGA debate is either completed or postponed. While Plaza is generally well-liked in Athens and among the Greek Cypriots, he is distrusted by the Turks.

13. There have been reports that exploratory conversations between the Turks and Greeks and between the Greek Cypriots and the Turks have taken place in New York. In the capitals concerned, however, the governments deny this and insist that proposals for direct talks now are premature. Makarios continues to insist that the only negotiations his government will engage in would be with the only other party "directly concerned," i.e., the Turkish Cypriots.

14. In any negotiations, agreement might be possible on many issues, including the desirability of an independent republic and respect for the island's territorial integrity. Two issues, however, would be extremely difficult to resolve. Turkey demands a federal form of government with geographic separation of the two communities and with enosis permanently precluded. The Greek Cypriots and the Greeks have termed "federation" totally unacceptable and insist on the right of the majority to determine the island's future through the exercise of the right of self-determination. No government in Athens could expect to survive if it participated in an agreement permanently precluding enosis.

15. Makarios' real intentions on the subject of enosis remain unclear. Last summer it was generally assumed he opposed enosis, since the loss of his own political power would inevitably follow. His public attitude at that time, however, could also be explained by his desire to court the Soviet Bloc and the non-aligned countries which

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opposed enosis on the grounds that the island and its military bases would be incorporated into NATO-member Greece. Since the recent change in Soviet policy and his realization that little was to be expected from the UNGA, Makarios has again been reaffirming that enosis is his ultimate goal.

16. While some observers have expressed hope that the Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government now may be more inclined to engage in negotiations, in the wake of the erosion of their international position the possibility also exists that as frustrations mount an even more dangerous situation may develop.

17. As hopes of effective UN action have dwindled in Athens and Nicosia, there have been rumors that enosis might suddenly be proclaimed, either by Makarios or following a military coup against Makarios by Greek officers serving in high positions on the island. Most observers feel, however, that a proclamation of "instant enosis" at this time is most unlikely because of a widely-held conviction that Turkish reaction to such a move would be violent. Far more probable would be the slow implementation of a program leading to "de facto enosis." Ties between Cyprus and Greece in all fields--political, economic and social--would be strengthened over a period of months or years until Cyprus became, in effect, an integral part of the Greek nation. This program presumably would be less likely to provoke a reaction from either Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots.

18. Makarios is committed to creation of majority rule on Cyprus with or without Turkish concurrence. In addition to implementation of his 13 points, he has announced his intention to promulgate a new electoral law in time for elections this summer. This law would eliminate the constitutional provision for separate elections for the two communities.

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19. When questioned about probable Turkish or Turkish Cypriot reaction to these moves, Makarios indicated little concern. The Turkish Cypriots, he stated, could participate in the creation of a new government if they wished. If they refused, they could stay in their "ghettos" and "wither on the vine." As for Ankara, Makarios appears confident that Cyprus is now too strong to be successfully invaded.

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20. This confidence presumably has been strengthened by recent arrival on Cyprus of significant quantities of Soviet-built military equipment. In December 1964, a Soviet ship brought more than 100 trucks to the island. In late January and early February, Greek ships arriving from Alexandria reportedly have unloaded Soviet-built anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, field artillery pieces, considerable quantities of ammunition and at least two motor torpedo boats.

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[redacted] T-34 tanks and possibly [redacted] more torpedo boats, are scheduled to arrive shortly. One of the problems raised by the arrival of these items is the possibility that the Greek Cypriots, particularly General Grivas, may become dangerously overconfident.

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21. The arrival of Soviet-built equipment may cause other far-ranging repercussions. Recent progress toward better relations between Moscow and Ankara may be seriously affected. The Turks could even consider the build-up of military equipment on Cyprus so detrimental to their strategic interests that they will attempt to destroy the equipment before it reaches the operational units of the Greek Cypriot National Guard.

22. The Greek Cypriots may decide to use their military power to eliminate some of the smaller Turkish enclaves on the island. Demands for the stationing of Greek Cypriot police patrols in these enclaves would be one possible way of provoking the Turks into taking preventive action and thus assume the onus of having resorted to violence. Such action would be easier if present

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UN forces engaged in maintaining the cease-fire were removed or reduced in number. The Cypriot Government is said to be preparing to request the UN Security Council to reduce the size of the 6,000-man UN force when the current mandate expires on 26 March. General Grivas, for one, reportedly is "fed up" with constant UN surveillance of his forces.

23. A more direct danger to peace involves the Turkish Army unit on Cyprus. Ankara has announced its intention to rotate part of its 650-man contingent in late February. Makarios has stated that the treaty providing for stationing of this unit on Cyprus is "dead" and thus Turkey will not be permitted to rotate its troops. Troop rotation caused a crisis last fall and was finally resolved when the Turkish Cypriots opened the Nicosia-Kyrenia road to Greek Cypriot travel in return for the government's acquiescence in the rotation. There are indications that Makarios is again hoping to gain concessions in return for permitting rotation. Turkish leaders have warned, however, that this time there will be no concessions and that attempts to delay the operation will not be tolerated.

24. Despite serious erosion in their international position during the past few weeks, the Greek Cypriots still appear to have time on their side. The high morale of the Turkish Cypriots today can be expected to deteriorate again in the absence of some solution which permits the several thousand refugees to return to their homes. In a last desperate move to force Turkish armed intervention, the Turkish Cypriots may yet launch the long-predicted attack against superior Greek Cypriot forces.

25. US and NATO interests would be directly involved in any new crisis. While the Turkish Government may no longer be able to mount a successful amphibious operation against Cyprus, because of the greatly increased defensive capabilities of the Cypriots, it could be expected again to launch air attacks against Greek Cypriot positions. More ominous, however, are reports from Ankara that in case of new hostilities on Cyprus, the main Turkish thrust will be against the Greek islands off the Turkish coast or against Greek Thrace. (Map)

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

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


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12 February 1965

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# SPECIAL REPORT

SOVIET POLICY AND TACTICS IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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12 February 1965

## SOVIET POLICY AND TACTICS IN THE CYPRUS DISPUTE

The USSR has skillfully exploited the Cyprus crisis to further a number of its policy objectives in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of the West. It has been able to pursue its major goal of weakening the NATO alliance by playing upon the ambitions and animosities of Greek and Turk without, thus far at least, committing itself to any specific course of action. In recent months Moscow has taken a position more favorable to that of Turkey as the new Soviet leadership has vigorously pursued a policy of rapprochement with Ankara.

### Soviet Objectives

Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean area has been aimed primarily at reducing the cohesion and effectiveness of the southern flank of NATO. Since the Cyprus crisis began, the USSR has consistently pursued this goal by exploiting tensions among NATO allies and by seeking to complicate efforts to achieve a settlement of the dispute. Thus, Moscow's policy during the prolonged crisis and Soviet gestures toward the Greek Cypriots and the Turks have resulted from strategic considerations which transcended the parochial issues of contention on the island.

Moscow's most immediate goal in Cyprus has been the termination of Western base rights. Soviet propaganda has encouraged Greek Cypriot opposition to the continuation of British sovereign base areas on the island. The USSR has also sought to discredit those political elements in Cyprus favorable to the West and to strengthen the already impressive position of the Communist

Party of Cyprus (AKEL). The influence of AKEL grew considerably during 1964 as the Makarios government consistently sought to give the impression of a closeness of views between the Greek Cypriot and Soviet positions.

The USSR has portrayed itself as the champion of the independence and integrity of the island. The Soviet Union has consistently opposed enosis (union with Greece). Soviet statements in public forums offering the Makarios' government an alternate source of support have encouraged it to maintain its independence of Athens.

Soviet support for the Makarios government, however, was not dictated by any inherent sympathy for the Greek Cypriots, but by the political and strategic considerations already outlined. In recent months, Soviet officials have expressed doubts about the long-term possibilities for Cypriot independence and have shown a full appreciation for Makarios' capacity for duplicity. Even when

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it was attacking Turkey most vigorously, the USSR managed to keep open its lines of contact with Ankara and to preserve its freedom of maneuver for a move toward rapprochement if this were expedient. In fact, it appears that both before and during the crisis Moscow has calculated that its objectives in the area were more likely to be achieved through closer relations with Turkey.

In recent years the USSR has made intermittent efforts to improve relations with Turkey. These moves have been prompted primarily by a desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the extensive NATO presence on the Soviet borders. As a part of this program, the USSR has slowly expanded its diplomatic, cultural, and economic contacts with Ankara and has tried to promote neutralism in Turkey.

The most recent Soviet efforts, begun in early or mid-1962, were moderately successful, and in June 1963 a Turkish parliamentary delegation visited the USSR. A Soviet delegation was to have returned the visit in January 1964, but the Cyprus crisis led to the postponement of this good-will gesture until January 1965.

Initial Reaction--  
Limited Support for Makarios

Moscow's initial reaction to the outbreak of communal fighting on Cyprus in December 1963 was to give full support to Makarios' renunciation of the London and Zurich agreements

of 1960 which established Cypriot independence. Soviet propaganda emphasized the need to respect the national independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriots and alleged that NATO was exploiting communal tensions to justify interference in the internal affairs of the island.

Soviet support for Makarios' efforts to block US-UK plans for a NATO peacekeeping force on the island was motivated in part by a concern that the West would succeed in using the crisis to strengthen its military position in Cyprus--thus jeopardizing Soviet security interests in the eastern Mediterranean. These same strategic calculations led the USSR to encourage Cypriot opposition to British base rights.

At the same time, this militant vocal support enabled Moscow to undercut Chinese charges that it was indifferent to anti-Western movements among oppressed nationalities. Finally, by encouraging the Greek Cypriots, who were trying to reduce the political role of the Turkish community, Moscow sought to aggravate relations between Ankara and Athens, thus further weakening the southern sector of NATO.

Despite its interest in encouraging Makarios to terminate the London and Zurich agreements, the USSR carefully avoided any commitment to support the Cypriot Government militarily.

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Tentative Gestures  
Toward Ankara

A new phase opened up last spring and summer as Moscow apparently calculated that the danger of Turkish intervention had diminished. During this period, Moscow began to spell out its opposition to enosis more clearly and at the same time sought to draw the anti-Turkish sting out of earlier statements. This tactic was reflected in a 4 May Khrushchev statement in Izvestia and a Pravda article the same day. Both commentaries sought to lay the blame for the crisis on "the imperialists and reactionaries that have their own special plans for Cyprus."

[redacted]  
sources, the USSR also offered Ankara aid and indicated that, as a gesture of friendship, a Soviet parliamentary delegation would visit Turkey in July. On 2 June, Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin told the press that the USSR had given assurances that it would not supply weapons and war material to Cyprus.

Opposition to  
Turkish Intervention

By the end of July, however, tensions in Cyprus had again

raised the danger of Turkish intervention. On 26 July Pravda published a highly inflammatory interview with Archbishop Makarios in which he expressed his "appreciation" for remarks made earlier in the month by Khrushchev concerning Cyprus. Makarios interpreted these remarks as a "serious warning" to Turkey against invasion; Khrushchev's statement fell far short of this, but Pravda allowed Makarios to give it a bellicose ring.

At the same time, however, Moscow may have become concerned that the Greek Cypriots had begun to believe their own propaganda.

[redacted]  
Cyprus asked the Soviet Union "to intervene" on its behalf, according to the Cypriot foreign minister. Khrushchev responded immediately with noncommittal notes to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu and to Makarios. Only on 15 August, after the danger of further Turkish attack had subsided, did a Soviet Government statement promise "help" in the event of foreign invasion.

Moscow apparently issued some private warnings to Turkey, but it is unclear how specific these were. Erkin told the US ambassador that on 15 August Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that in case of further Turkish military activity in

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Cyprus, the USSR "will help Cyprus militarily." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Following up these conversations, Erkin approached the US ambassador on more than one occasion for US assurances of support in the event of Soviet retaliation against further Turkish military action in Cyprus. Erkin may have elaborated on Gromyko's warning simply to obtain assurances from the US before Turkey undertook any further action in Cyprus.

The Soviet Government statement of 15 August offered to open negotiations with Cyprus concerning the "help" to be rendered in case of an invasion. As a result of this offer, a Greek Cypriot delegation traveled to Moscow and on 30 September signed an agreement with the USSR. The full details of this agreement have not yet been reported, but there is speculation that it covered a wide range of military material.

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Deliveries under the pact began in January 1965 and are likely to be finished by mid-February. The USSR is known to have transshipped, through Egyptian ports, antiaircraft guns and artillery, tanks and armored cars, as well as spare parts and ammunition. [REDACTED]

#### Recent Moves Toward Turkey

By the time of the Cypriot visit to Moscow it was already becoming clear that the USSR was determined to resume its efforts to improve relations with Ankara, and it is unlikely that the Greek Cypriots received many specific promises from the Soviet authorities. Moscow may have calculated that Turkey had abandoned further plans for an attack on Cyprus and that Archbishop Makarios was moving toward accepting enosis. Under these circumstances, it was not only possible but necessary to seek an improvement of relations with Turkey and to base this effort in part on a common opposition to enosis.

Moscow's efforts have been facilitated by Ankara's conviction that the West had not given it adequate support over Cyprus. In the latter half of 1964, this disillusionment led to a feeling in Turkey that it was necessary to improve relations with the USSR. The first step in this effort was Erkin's 30 October - 6 November visit to Moscow.

This visit, first proposed by the USSR in mid-1963, was used by both governments to demonstrate a renewed warmth in relations. This took the form of a Soviet recognition of the "lawful rights" of the Turkish community on the island--a tactical gain from the Turkish point of view--and an agreement on cultural and scientific exchanges. Subsequently, a Turkish

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technical delegation visited the USSR in December for two weeks and concluded an agreement to expand trade.

The USSR quickly responded to the Erkin visit by sending to Turkey the long-delayed parliamentary delegation, led by presidium member Podgorny, from 4 to 13 January 1965. During the visit Podgorny made routine reference to such issues as Turkish adherence to NATO and sought support for the Soviet position on UN Article 19, but directed most of his efforts toward improving the atmosphere of relations. He offered economic aid to Turkey and invited both President Gursel and Prime Minister Inonu to visit the USSR.

Despite a Turkish show of optimism that the USSR is moving to endorse Ankara's position on Cyprus, Podgorny specifically refused to recognize the validity of the London and Zurich agreements--which give Turkey the right to intervene militarily. Moreover, on 13 January TASS announced a visit to Moscow of an AKEL delegation to discuss the Cyprus situation. This announcement reiterated the standard Soviet line that the independence and integrity of Cyprus must be respected, that foreign interference must be avoided, and that the Cypriots must be free to decide their own affairs.

Podgorny promised a statement endorsing the principle of federation as a possible means of settling the dispute on the island. This promise was partially fulfilled by an equivocal statement

in Izvestia by Gromyko on 21 January. Gromyko suggested that federation might be chosen by the Cypriot people, but immediately qualified this statement by indicating that such a "system presupposes the existence of a single centralized government."

Although Gromyko's reference to federation excited the most comment among the principals to the dispute, it was almost certainly intended to be read as part of a larger scheme which would contain elements pleasing to both the Greek Cypriots and to Ankara. Moscow probably was aware of the opposition in Athens and Nicosia to federation, but it appears to have miscalculated the intensity of the emotional impact of the term "federal solution." This suggests that Soviet efforts to pursue a consistent policy, while giving the appearance of being all things to all men, may have finally broken down. Moscow's recent stand, for instance, has already begun to erode the once-strong position of AKEL on the island and appears to have severely reduced its chances of coming to power by electoral means.

Behind the balancing act attempted by Gromyko, however, was a clear statement of basic Soviet interests in the affair: opposition to enosis and to the presence of foreign troops on the island. Gromyko declared that "the main thing now is to ensure Cyprus' independence and territorial integrity" and that "the withdrawal of all foreign troops" is necessary.

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Outlook: Limitations on  
Soviet Action

Soviet goals have not shifted since the downfall of Khrushchev, but the new leaders appear to be moving with greater vigor to improve relations with Ankara. Erkin's visit was the first by a high-level foreign non-Communist official after the fall of Khrushchev. The dispatch of a figure with the stature of Podgorny and the propaganda treatment of his visit reflect considerable Soviet interest in impressing Turkey with the potential gains offered by closer relations.

Despite Moscow's quick recognition and exploitation of Turkish disillusionment with the West, Soviet policy is to a degree limited by past Soviet initiatives. The logic of the situation following the Turkish air strikes in August demanded at least the offer to "help" the Cypriots. This help is probably not of such a magnitude as to have a serious effect on the military situation on the island, but its psychological impact could damage the Soviet position in Turkey. Moscow, moreover, would face a genuine dilemma if Turkey should take a threatening stand against Makarios' recent steps to promulgate an electoral law which disregards the terms of the London and Zurich agreements.

Finally, Soviet leaders are probably aware of the fragile nature of the recent improvement in relations with Turkey. The rapprochement of the past few months has been undertaken over the opposition of the Justice Party, which now appears likely to win the forthcoming elections in Turkey. Despite growing trends of independence and opportunism in Ankara's foreign policy, there remains a strong current of anti-Russian feeling in Turkey and it is unlikely that there will be any significant change in attitudes in the next few years.

Despite these limitations on its freedom of action, the USSR will continue to seek to expand its role in the eastern Mediterranean at the expense of the West. It is unlikely to assist in seeking a solution of the Cyprus problem, since it has most to gain by a continuation of tensions between Greek and Turk. The USSR might actively oppose any solution which partitioned the island, as was proposed by Turkey last summer. Moscow is likely, however, to pursue its rapprochement with Ankara as far as possible, without compromising its position elsewhere in the Afro-Asian world in the event of renewed Turkish threats of intervention.

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65-734

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON

10 FEB 1965

Honorable John A. McCone  
Director, Central Intelligence  
Washington, D. C. 20025

Dear John:

The recently published National Intelligence Estimate, "Capabilities of Soviet General Purpose Forces, 1964-1970," is an excellent document which promises to be very helpful. It represents a marked improvement in our understanding of the Soviet forces, an improvement which should assist us greatly in our planning for the future.

I notice that the estimate reflects the kind of examination of evidence which I had in mind when I asked that a joint CIA/DIA study group on this problem be established two years ago. I trust that this group will continue to function as needed, and will make a final report on what it has been possible to accomplish before disbanding.

I am sending a similar letter to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency.

Sincerely,

*BR*

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